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Protection of Endangered Gorillas and
Chimpanzees in International Trade:
Can CITES Help?
By VALERIE KARNO*
Member of the Class of 1991
I. INTRODUCION
At least forty thousand primates are traded internationally every
year.' Of these, at least thirteen thousand are sold illegally.2 Smugglers
are currently trading live, endangered primates throughout the world,3
and statistics indicate that unless this trade is stopped, certain primates,
such as the gorilla and wild chimpanzee, will shortly be extinct.4
Over the last twenty years, commerce practices have caused between
forty and ninety thousand needless chimpanzee deaths.5 The effect of
these deaths on the viability of the species is profound. Field surveys
estimate the current world chimpanzee population at less than 250,000
individuals. 6 In Western Africa, where over one million chimpanzees
* B.A., University of California, Berkeley, 1987. Special thanks is extended to Dr. Geza
Teleki for his valuable assistance and commentary.
1. World Trade in Wildlife, TRAFFIC (U.S.A.), Oct. 1990, at 1. All the numerical
figures presented in this paper represent only those animals traded with documentation. Large
numbers of animals move without documentation, so these numbers are rough minimal esti-
mates at best. Many more animals have actually been traded than can be represented by the
statistics in this Note. Telephone interview with Geza Teleki, Chairman of the Committee for
the Conservation and Care of Chimpanzees [CCCC] (Feb. 13, 1991).
2. This figure is consistent with and reflective of the fact that about one-third of all U.S.
imports are illegal. Fuller, Hemley & Fitzgerald, Wildlife Trade Law Implementation in Devel-
oping Countries The Experience in Latin America, 5 B.U. INT'L LJ. 287, 290 (1987) (citing
Division of Law Enforcement, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Wild-
life Import Statistics). Worldwide trade figures are likely to be similar.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 107-09, 120, 123, 130 for examples of recent smug-
gling activity.
4. 1rimate Trade, TRAFFIC (U.S.A.), Mar. 1989, at I [hereinafter Primate Trade].
5. CCCC, CHIMPANZEE SURVIVAL: A CRISIS FOR GLOBAL CONCERN 1 (1990) [herein-
after CCCC, CHIMPANZEE SURVIVAL]. Forty to ninety thousand chimpanzees have not actu-
ally been taken from Africa. Rather, this figure represents the total extermination rate
accompanying trade, and includes the mothers who have been killed but were never intended
to be, and never have been, traded.
6. Id
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used to live, now a mere 10,000 survive.7 There are only 300 to 350 wild
mountain gorillas left in the entire world,' one-third living in the impene-
trable forest in Uganda, and the other two-thirds living in the Virunga
Volcanoes near the borders of Uganda, Rwanda, and Zaire.9 There are
fewer than 100,000 lowland gorillas, starting in the far east of Nigeria,
and living in Cameroon, Gabon, Zaire, Equatorial Guinea, and the
Congo Republic.1"
Although the chimpanzee and the gorilla are the two animals most
closely related to humans on this planet, we are pushing them towards
extinction for commercial reasons. Genetically, chimpanzees have a
ninety-nine percent overlap with humans; they also have similar psycho-
logical and behavioral patterns.'" For instance, they can learn, and can
communicate with humans and other chimpanzees through sign lan-
guage.' 2 Tragically, these similarities give rise to a high demand for
these live primates, and consequently, zoos pay large sums of money for
live gorillas, and biomedical research companies pay large sums for
chimpanzees.' 3  These monetary incentives provide smugglers ample
cause to pursue the trading of these species.
1 4
However, the methods of trading chimpanzees and gorillas have
drastically depleted the populations of both species, and are economically
7. I d
8. Butynski, The Impenetrable Forest-Refuge for the Mountain Gorilla, INTERNATIONAL
PRIMATE PROTECTION LEAGUE [IPPL] NEWSL., Nov. 1987, at 9.
9. There are other gorillas in captivity in zoos across the world. Id.
10. Telephone interview with Shirley McGreal, Chairwoman of IPPL (Feb. 19, 1991),
11. CCCC, CHIMPANZEE SURVIVAL, supra note 5, at 2.
12. Id. Though this Note focuses on extinction, and not welfare, it is important to note
that chimpanzees and gorillas can also suffer as can humans, and so should be treated with
compassion. Scientists have stated that there are "not one but four species of the genus Homo
exist[ing] on earth today-the gorilla, Homo gorilla; the two chimpanzees, Homo troglodytes
and Homo paniscus; and the human, Homo sapiens." People for the Ethical Treatment ofAnl
mals, PETA NEws, Spring 1987, at 1. Jeremey Bentham wrote that "lilt may one day come
to be recognized that the number of the legs, [or] the villosity of the skin.., are reasons...
insufficient for abandoning a sensitive being.... The question is not, Can they talk? but, Can
they suffer?" Id. at 4 (emphasis in original). It is important to prevent the unwarranted mis-
treatment of these highly advanced animals who indeed do have a tremendous capacity for
suffering. Unfortunately, there is not room to do this subject justice in this Note.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 25-26 for sample priccs paid for chimpanzees and
gorillas. Chimpanzees and gorillas are traded for different purposes: biomedical research com-
panies are largely responsible for the chimpanzee trade, while zoos are responsible for gorilla
trading. Most zoos trading gorillas are found in the developing Third World countries, though
certainly not all. Japan, Spain, and Eastern Europe also have imp)rted gorillas into their zoos.
Telephone interview with Shirley McGreal, Chairwoman of IPPL (Feb. 19, 1991).
14. See Primate Trade, supra note 4, at 1.
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inefficient. Normally, ten chimpanzees die before one is delivered.1 5
Smugglers typically target nursing infants one to two years old for
trade. 6 To retrieve the infant, poachers will shoot the mother and seize
the child. 7 Since chimpanzees move together, four to five adult chim-
panzees are often murdered to capture a single offspring.' 8
Furthermore, at least ninety percent of captured animals die en
route to their trade destination because of abhorent packing conditions.19
They suffer lingering and painful deaths from freezing, overheating, de-
hydration, starvation, or suffocation because they are locked in small
crates with their feet and hands bound together during transportation on
airplanes or ships.20
Moreover, the new double incentive to receive both money and food
from a chimpanzee increases population depletion. In Africa, primate
species have traditionally been hunted for food. Now, the monetary in-
centive for poaching greatly increases the likelihood of an endangered
primate's death.2 Hunters can receive twice the profit they used to get
from killing primates solely for food;' now poachers can shoot mothers
for food and also sell the mothers' infants to dealers.' As the Commit-
tee for the Conservation and Care of Chimpanzees has explained, "these
cash incentives ... increase decimation of exactly that segment of chim-
panzee society which is most essential to survival."'"
This accelerated population depletion is occurring because individ-
ual primate dealers profit so greatly from trading chimpanzees and goril-
las. A primate dealer will spend a maximum of 1000 U.S. dollars
delivering a live chimpanzee or gorilla from Africa to another country."5
The dealer will be paid 20,000 to 50,000 dollars per chimpanzee, and will
receive much more for a gorilla.26 Thus, a dealer will earn at least 24,000







21. CCCC, CURRENT THREATS TO THE SURVIVAL OF CHIMPANZEES IN EQUATORIAL




25. The dealer will spend $100.00-S400.00 acquiring the animal, and will spend a few
hundred dollars shipping the animal overseas. Telephone interview with Geza Teleki, Chair-
man of CCCC (Nov. 29, 1990).
26. Id For example, the Guadalajara Zoo in Mexico paid S130,000.00 for two wild-
caught gorillas exported from Equatorial Guinea in June 1989. Update on Mexican Gorillas,
1991]
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dollars per primate. This money will generally be tax exempt because
payments are made to Swiss banks.27 Stringent imposition of trade re-
strictions will help curb the double incentive to poach because dealers
will be less able to successfully complete transactions, will thus derive
less profit from smuggling, and will then be less inclined to offer incentive
to poachers to capture wild primates. The World Health Organization
(WHO) and the Ecosystem Conservation Group (ECG)28 issued the fol-
lowing policy statement in 1981 in favor of strictly enforcing trade re-
strictions for endangered primates:
The WHO strongly recommends that (1) endingered, vulnerable and
rare species be considered for use in biomedical research projects only
if they are obtained from existing self-sustaining captive breeding colo-
nies .... (2) species categorized as status unknown or indeterminate
also not be considered for use in such research projects until adequate
data indicate that they are not endangered.... 29
This statement is significant because the WHO, as the representative
of worldwide sentiment, thereby implies that the preservation of chim-
panzees and gorillas outweighs the importance of research using wild pri-
mates. The threat of imminent extinction of the wild chimpanzee and
gorilla coupled with economically inefficient trade results, further sup-
ports the need to protect these animals.
Protection of endangered species is a relatively new concept. Prior
to the 1970s, the vast majority of international trade in flora and fauna
went unregulated, since the international community had not yet unified
in an attempt to control trade in this area.30 Any domestically enacted
regulations of international wildlife trade had been ineffective on an in-
ternational scale,3 and consequently the international community uni-
fied to create the Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Species (CITES)32 in 1973. CITES was created recognizing that wild
IPPL NEWSL., Dec. 1989, at 9. The Chiba City Municipal Zoo in Japan paid $575,00.00 for
two poached gorillas imported from Spain in 1987. Smuggled Gorillas Sold for World Record
Price, IPPL NEWSL., Apr. 1990, at 14.
27. Telephone interview with Geza Teleki, Chairman of CCCC (Nov. 29, 1990).
28. The ECG includes UNESCO, UNEP, FAO, and IUCN.
29. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, POLICY STATEMENT ON USE OF PRIMATES FOR
BIOMEDICAL PURPOSES (1981).
30. Telephone interview with Geza Teleki, Chairman of CCCC (Feb. 13, 1991). See also
S. LYSTER, INTERNATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW 239-40 (1985).
31. See Note, International Trade in Endangered Species Under C. T.E.S. Direct Listing
vs Reverse Listing, 15 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 107, 108 (1982).
32. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora,
Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, T.I.A.S. No. 8249, 993 U.N.T.S. 243 [hereinafter CITES].
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fauna must be protected "for this and the generations to come."'33
To promote protection, CITES regulates trade at varying levels of
stringency: the treaty heavily regulates international commercial trade
in species threatened with extinction, but more leniently regulates trade
in species whose survival is not yet, but may become, threatened. 4
Although CITES has been characterized as one of the most successful
treaties for the conservation of wildlife,3 circumvention of the agreement
remains a significant problem.
This Note will examine the trade of endangered chimpanzees and
gorillas in the context of CITES. It will explore the circumvention of
CITES in both member and nonmember countries, and will suggest
methods for improving the implementation of the treaty.
II. THE CITES TREATY
A. Treaty Provisions
The CITES treaty classifies species into one of three appendices.
This classification determines the extent of the trade restrictions for each
species.
36
Species classified under Appendix I are those currently threatened
with extinction; they receive the most protection CITES affords." Ap-
pendix I also includes those genera for which distinguishing a rare indi-
vidual species from other members of the nonthreatened genus is
difficult.3" This prevents traders from passing off a rare species as a more
common one. Appendix I includes all gorillas (Gorilla gorilla ) and wild
33. IM Preamble, 27 U.S.T. at 1090, 993 U.N.T.S. at 245.
34. S. LYSTER, supra note 30, at 240.
35. Heppes & McFadden, The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species
of Wild Fauna and Flora: Improving the Prospects for Preserving Our Biological Heritage, 5
B.U. INT'L L.J. 229 (1987) (citing S. LYSTER, supra note 30, at 240).
36. CITES, supra note 32, art. II, 27 U.S.T. at 1092, 993 U.N.T.S. at 245-46.
37. Id art. 111, 27 U.S.T. at 1093-95, 993 U.N.T.S. at 246-47. For further information
about Appendices I, H, and H, see generally Fuller, Hemley & Fitzgerald, supra note 2, at
289; Favre, Tension Points Within the Language of the CITES Treaty, 5 B.U. INT'L LJ. 247
(1987) [hereinafter Favre Tension Points]; Heppes & McFadden, supra note 35, at 229; Thorn-
sen & Brautigam, CITES in the European Economic Communit: Who Benefits?, 5 B.U. INT'L
L.. 269 (1987); McFadden, Asian Compliance with CITES- Problems and Prospects, 5 B.U.
INT'L LJ. 311 (1987); Note, International Trade in Wildlife: How Effective is the Endangered
Species Treaty?, 15 CAL. WESTERN INT'L LJ. 111, 118 (1985); Kosloff& Trexier, The Conven-
don on International Trade in Endangered Species." Enforcement Theory and Practice in the
United States, 5 B.U. INT'L LJ. 327, 330 (1987); D. FAvEE, INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN
ENDANGERED SPEcrs 31-73, 105-20, 139-47 (1989).
38. S. LYSTER, supra note 30, at 243.
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chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes). 9
Appendix II of CITES protects species that may become threatened
with extinction unless trade is strictly regulated. It extends coverage
whenever there exists an "indication" that such a result is possible.4" A
comprehensive list of Appendix II species was created at CITES' incep-
tion. However, the Scientific Authority of each party41 is responsible for
determining when the export of a species should be limited "in order to
maintain that species throughout its range at a level consistent with its
role in the ecosystems in which it occurs and well above the level at
which that species might become eligible for inclusion in Appendix
1 ... 42
Appendix III allows a CITES member to protect any species in dan-
ger of extinction in its country, by allowing the member to require a
permit for the species' exportation. For example, if Kenya decided that
it wanted to protect the zebra, it could place the zebra within Appendix
III protection. This would not protect the zebra within Kenya itself, but
any other country wishing to import a zebra from Kenya would first
need to acquire a CITES export permit from the Management Authority
of Kenya. This provision helps countries gain inte:rnational cooperation
to prevent the exploitation of certain species.a3
Article VII, section 4 further distinguishes the categorization of
animal species. It states that if specimens of Appendix I animals, nor-
mally prohibited from commercial trade, are bred in captivity, they are
eligible for trade as Appendix II species.' This controversial distinction
weakens CITES' effectiveness considerably, as will be discussed further
in a later section.
CITES operates on both an international and a domestic level. In-
ternationally, the CITES Secretariat monitors trade reports submitted by
each nation. Article XI of CITES requires the parties to meet at least
once every two years, unless the Conference decides otherwise, to review
past implementation and recommend treaty improvements.45
In its domestic administration scheme, CITES requires every party
to appoint authorities within the country to monitor imports and ex-
39. CITES, supra note 32, app. I.
40. S. LYsrER, supra note 30, at 244; CITES, supra note 32, art. IV, 27 U.S.T. at 1095-97,
993 U.N.T.S. at 247-48.
41. The Scientific Authority is explained infra at text accompanying note 46.
42. CITES, supra note 32, art. IV, para. 3, 27 U.S.T. at 10')5-96, 993 U.N.T.S. at 247.
43. Id. art. V, 27 U.S.T. at 1097-99, 993 U.N.T.S. at 248.
44. S. LYsTER, supra note 30, at 260.
45. See id. at 241; CITES, supra note 32, art. XI, 27 U.S.T at 1104-05, 993 U.N.T.S. at
251-52.
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ports. Each nation has at least one Management Authority, who grants
import and export permits, and one Scientific Authority, who determines
if trade is detrimental to the survival of the potentially traded species.46
CITES controls international trade through a permit system. Per-
mits are granted by a Management Authority, as designated in article IX
of the treaty, and permit awards must strictly comply with the explicit
conditions and restrictions on trade contained in the appendices.4"
Traders of Appendix I species must obtain permits from both the
exporting and importing countries. CITES states that an export permit
may be granted only when all of the following conditions are met: 1) the
Scientific Authority of the exporting nation advises that the export is not
detrimental to the survival of the exported species; 2) the Management
Authority of the export state is satisfied that the specimen was not ob-
tained in contravention of domestic laws; 3) the Management Authority
is satisfied that a living specimen has been prepared sufficiently to mini-
mize the risk of injury or cruel treatment; and 4) the Management Au-
thority is satisfied that the importing nation has granted an import
permit.48 CITES conditions the granting of import permits for Appendix
I species upon satisfaction of all of the following requirements: 1) the
importing state's Scientific Authority has advised that the import will not
be detrimental to the survival of the species; 2) the Scientific Authority of
the importing state is satisfied that the recipient of the living specimen is
equipped to properly house the specimen; and 3) the Management Au-
thority of the import state is satisfied the specimen will not be used pri-
marily for commercial purposes. 49 Although Article I of CITES lists
definitions of terms used in the treaty, no definition of the word "com-
mercial" is given. This Note will later examine how the Parties have
interpreted "commercial," and how "commercial" should be used within
the meaning of the treaty.
Less stringent permit requirements apply to trade involving Appen-
dix II specimens. First, the trader need only secure an export permit
from the country of origin; no import permit is necessary. Second, in
contrast to Appendix I specimens, Appendix II specimens can be traded
for commercial purposes.50
To monitor shipments in and out of each nation more effectively,
article VIII, section 3 urges each CITES party to designate special ports
46. Kosloff & Trexler, supra note 37, at 334.
47. S. LYSMR, supra note 30, at 240.
48. CITES, supra note 32, art. M, para. 2(d), 27 U.S.T. at 1093, 993 U.N.T.S. at 246.
49. Id. art. H, para. 3(c), 27 U.S.T. at 1094, 993 U.N.T.S. at 246.
50. See id art. IV, para. 2, 27 U.S.T. at 1095, 993 U.N.T.S. at 247.
1991]
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of exit and entry for all exports and imports of wildlife. Thus far, very
few parties have exercised this suggestion, and allow trade through all
ports. The United States, however, has designated nine ports to be used
solely for wildlife importation and exportation. Evidence in the United
States suggests that limiting the number of ports available for wildlife
trade facilitates the discovery of smuggling activity. 51
In an effort to thwart the forgery of permits, the Secretariat offered
to supply interested governments with security stamps in June 1984.
These stamps were designed to be placed on export permits by the Man-
agement Authority of the exporting nation. With the extra stamp, offi-
cials believed it would be more difficult for a smuggler to change
information about the specimen on the permit, and pass the animal off as
an unendangered species or a captive-bred specimen.52 However, few
members use the stamps, and thus the results have been negligible.
Nevertheless, the International Air Transport. Association (IATA)
requires that animals being shipped be precisely identified. 53 The air
waybill used for shipment of any animal should accurately reflect the
CITES permit description of the animal. The lack of matching descrip-
tions, or an apparent inconsistency between the air waybill description
and the actual shipped animals are signposts of illegal activity, since an
animal in a crate should be that same animal described on the air waybill
and the CITES export and import permits.
CITES parties do not need permits to trade listed species with non-
party states.54 Members trading with nonmembers accounts for an esti-
mated thirty percent of all wildlife transactions.5" Such trade is not pro-
hibited under CITES.
CITES offers little guidance in setting approp:date penalties for peo-
ple convicted of illegal trade.56 There is no concerted international
51. S. LYsrER, supra note 30, at 267.
52. Id. at 255.
53. Update on the Cameroun Gorilla Shipment, IPPL NEWSL., July 1987, at 2, 3. The
IATA is an international organization that has members as does CITES. The IATA creates
shipping standards and provides shipping crates that conform to these standards for shipping
live animals. IATA members have an obligation to follow the standards set forth by IATA.
Id.
54. Article X of CITES governs trade with nonparties, and itates that "[wihere export or
re-export is to, or import is from, a State not a party to the present Convention, comparable
documentation issued by the competent authorities in that State which substantially conforms
with the requirements of the present Convention for permits and certificates may be accepted
in lieu thereof by any party." CITES, supra note 32, art. X, 27 U.S.T. at 1104, 993 U.N.T.S. at
251.
55. Heppes & McFadden, supra note 35, at 241.
56. S. LYSTER, supra note 30, at 264.
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scheme in CITES to penalize smugglers. Penalties are left to the individ-
ual governments.57 However, Article VIII of CITES provides for confis-
cation of live or dead specimens illegally traded. Live specimens must be
returned to their state of export or be sent to rescue centers or appropri-
ate holding places.5" However, the CITES provisions for replacing ille-
gally traded specimens are inadequate for primates. Often primates
cannot be reintroduced into the wild because they will be rejected and
attacked by the native primates.59
B. Methods of Compliance
Many CITES members implement the terms of the treaty by enact-
ing legislation consistent with treaty provisions. These acts are patterned
after CITES, usually enumerating lists of certain species that cannot be
exported or imported."o National laws foster adherence to CITES, since
national acts carry enforceable penalties for violations.61
In 1973 the United States enacted the Endangered Species Act
(ESA) to implement CITES.62 The United States is the world's largest
importer of primates, importing 16,000 to 18,000 live animals yearly, pri-
marily for research purposes.63 Because of its influence in primate trade
as the largest importer, the U.S. actions can serve as a model for other
57. Article VIII of CITES provides that the "Parties shall take appropriate measures to
enforce the provisions of the present Convention.... These shall include measures: (a) to
penalize trade in, or possession of, such specimens, or both; and (b) to provide for the confisca-
tion or return to the State of export of such specimens." CITES, supra note 32, art. VIII, pama.
1, 27 U.S.T. at 1101, 993 U.N.T.S. at 250.
58. Id art. VIII, para. 4, 27 U.S.T. at 1102, 993 U.N.T.S. at 250. Article 1 defines speci-
men as "any animal or plant, whether alive or dead." Id art. I(b), 27 U.S.T. at 1090, 993
U.N.T.S. at 245.
59. See S. LYsTER, supra note 30, at 265-66, for a brief discussion of confistion dilem-
mas. See also D. FAVan, supra note 37, at 230.
60. See, eg., Endangered Species Act [ESA], Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (1973)
(codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1976)).
61. For example, in Australia, illegal bird importers were sentenced to five years impris-
onment for violating CITES, which was the maximum punishment under Australian law. In
the United States, the falsification of a CITES document relating to polar bears received ten
months imprisonment and a $50,000.00 fine under U.S. law. CITES Secretariat, Proceedings of
the Seventh Meeting of the Conference of the Parties, Oct. 9-20, 1989, CITES Doc. 7.20, Annex
3, at 39-40 (1989) [hereinafter CITES Doc. 7.20].
62. ESA, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (1973) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544
(1976)). Article VIII of CITES imposes upon each party the obligation of passing domestic
legislation to implement CITES. CITES, supra note 32, art. VIII, pam. 1, 27 U.S.T. at 1101,
993 U.N.T.S. at 250. However, CITES does not demand any particular model of legislation be
adopted. The language of the treaty is general, and specific legislation is left up to each mem-
ber country. See D. FAvRE, supra note 37, at 214-15.
63. Primate Trade, supra note 4, at 2. See also U.S. Imports of Wildlife, TRAFFIC
(U.S.A.), Mar. 1989, at 1.
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countries; the ESA, as a national act, can be a guideline for countries
wishing to implement similar legislation. The ESA lists a series of en-
dangered species distinct from, but overlapping those listed in CITES."r
It includes fifty-eight primate species and five subspecies as endangered.65
Until March 12, 1990, the ESA listed all chimpanzees as threatened,
but not endangered.66 Despite even that designation, however, two spe-
cies of chimpanzees, Pan paniscus and Pan troglodytes, were also listed
on an exceptions list created independently of the ESA.67 The exception
stated that any of these chimpanzees "which were held in captivity in the
United States on the effective date of the final rulemaking (November 18,
1976), or their progeny born after that date, or the progeny of such speci-
mens legally imported into the United States after that date, are exempt
from the prohibitions of the ESA, including import and export. ' ,6 This
exemption has nullified many of the protections afforded the chimpanzee
by CITES and the ESA, since many chimpanzees which should be classi-
fied Appendix I under CITES can be traded without restriction.
69
The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service upgraded wild chimpanzees to
the Endangered Species list on March 12, 1990.70 Also, Congress en-
acted legislation making it illegal to use public funds for overseas projects
using wild-caught chimpanzees.71 However, captive populations of the
chimpanzee remain classified as threatened, and are still covered by the
exemption "allowing activities otherwise prohibited. ' '7 2 Captive-born
chimpanzees can still be traded for pets, entertainment, and exhibitions,
despite these trades being commercial activities and thus being counter to
CITES.
73
The ESA's import and export provisions prohibit any trade of wild-
life which violates CITES. The ESA outlaws possession of specimens
traded in violation of CITES, and condemns the exportation, importa-
tion, sale, or shipment of any species listed by CITES during the course
64. Kosloff & Trexler, supra note 37, at 345.
65. Primate Trade, supra note 4, at 2.
66. See ESA, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544
(1976)).
67. U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, FISH & WILDLIFE FACrs: NON-HUMAN PRIMATES,
FWS-F-035 (March 1985).
68. Id.
69. Telephone interview with Geza Teleki, Chairman of CCCC (Nov. 29, 1990),
70. 55 Fed. Reg. 9129 (1990) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
71. Act of Sept. 20, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-436, § 218, 102 Stat. 1688 (1988). Telephone
interview with Geza Teleki, Chairman of CCCC (Nov. 29, 1990); see also, CCCC, CIniMPAN-
ZEE TRADE, supra note 15.
72. 55 Fed. Reg. 9129 (1990).
73. CCCC, CHIMPANzEE TRADE, supra note 15, at 2.
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of commercial activity.74 Because of the ESA, over 100 million dollars of
illegal goods are seized each year. This resounding success is especially
noteworthy because the United States employs only fifty-five wildlife in-
spectors spread among nine designated ports of entry. 5 These statistics
are promising for countries with little money for staff, because they
demonstrate that proper inspection techniques, rather than numbers of
employees, produce results.76
The subsequently enacted Lacey Act provides an even stronger
smuggling deterrent than the ESA alone.77 The Lacey Act authorizes
civil and criminal sanctions for violations of foreign law, by allowing the
United States to enforce other countries' wildlife trade laws in the United
States." Under the Lacey Act, a person who imports or exports animals
in violation of the laws of a foreign country or of a treaty violates U.S.
Federal law.79 Violating the Lacey Act is a felony, and thus punishes
illegal activity more severely than the ESA. The Omnibus Crime Con-
trol Act further increases criminal penalties." When coupled with the
Lacey Act, the Omnibus Crime Control Act provides a maximum crimi-
nal punishment of 250,000 dollars for individuals, or 500,000 dollars for
others, plus 5 years imprisonment."1 These harsher penalties are
designed to deter illegal trade within the United States.8" Furthermore,
74. Kosloff & Trexler, supra note 37, at 34647.
75. See id at 344. Favre says there are twelve designated ports of entry in the United
States. For discussion, see D. FAVRE, supra note 37, at 228.
76. The case of Defenders of Wildlife, Inc. v. Endangered Species Scientific Authority,
659 F.2d 168 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 963 (1981), demonstrates how national
legislation can and does implement CITES. In Defenders, the court, pursuant to the Endan-
gered Species Act, forbade the U.S. government from exporting bobcat skins pending compli-
ance with CITES' reliable population estimates and kill levels necessary for a nondetriment
finding under CITES. Conversely, Defenders of Wildlife, Inc. v. Endangered Species Author-
ity, 725 F.2d 726 (D.C. Cir. 1984) shows how national legislation can take away from the
implementation of a treaty. The court held there that the ESA had been amended, and now no
longer required population estimates and kill requirements for bobcat exports under CITES.
See Kosloff & Trexler, supra note 37, at 353.
77. 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371-3378 (1988).
78. Kosloff & Trexler, supra note 37, at 348.
79. Id at 349; Lacey Act § 3(a), 16 U.S.C. § 3372(a) (1988).
80. Omnibus Crime Control Act, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837 (1984), amended by
Pub. L. No. 99-217, 99 Stat. 1728 (1985) (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.). The
creation of the Omnibus Crime Control Act reflects "a Congressional belief that criminal pen-
alties in many federal statutes were insufficient to act as an effective deterrent to unlawful
activity." Kosloff & Trexler, supra note 37, at 352. Thus, the act increases the criminal penal-
ties of many federal statutes.
81. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3571(b)-(c), 3581(b) (1988). The Omnibus Crime Control Act was cre-
ated in 1984 to increase the possible fines for all crimes. For further information about the
Omnibus Crime Control Act, see Kosloff & Trexler, supra note 37, at 347.
82. See Kosloff & Trexler, supra note 37, at 347.
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these Acts are examples for both CITES and non-CITES members desir-
ing to enact similar national legislation.
In contrast to national legislation, such as the ESA in the United
States, citizens of Zambia designed a grassroots activist program to en-
force CITES. 3 Zambians began a confiscation program for those ani-
mals which were protected by CITES yet had been traded in
contravention of the treaty. Since the early 1980s Zambian game war-
dens have confiscated chimpanzees imported and owned in violation of
CITES. The game wardens have increasingly focused on apprehending
local smugglers and confiscating their captured primates. The program
has significantly decreased Zambian smuggling activity.8 4 This campaign
has excelled partly because of its posteonfiscation procedures. After the
chimpanzees are confiscated, a licensed private chimpanzee orphanage
takes and cares for the animals in anticipation of their release into a natu-
ral habitat sanctuary. 5 Currently, Zambia is the only African country
with an effective confiscation program.86
The Zambian confiscation program shows that adherence to CITES
can occur at multiple levels. Countries like the United States, that gov-
ern themselves with a formal system of laws and courts, find legislation
effective. However, for developing countries with less formal govern-
mental control, individuals can actively prevent smuggling. Citizens can
support CITES by personally guarding against poachers.
I. CIRCUMVENTION
As of August 1990, 109 countries were party to CITES.87 The sheer
number of parties is a great achievement. However, smuggling and legal
circumvention are still rampant among both members and non-
members. 88
Smuggling of chimpanzees89 begins mainly in several countries in
83. A Visit with Sheila and David Siddle and Their Sixteen Chimpanzees, IPPL NEWSL.,
Nov. 1987, at 3.
84. Id.
85. The natural habitat sanctuary is a large space resembling the wild, where many or-
phaned chimpanzees and other animals can reside without actually being released into the
total wilderness. For example, the Chimfunshi Wildlife Orphanage in Zambia will eventually
have 2000 acres lying within a riverbend into which the chimpaznzees can gradually be rc-
leased. Id. at 3-4.
86. See id.
87. CITES Parties, TRAFFIC (U.S.A.), Aug. 1990 [hereinafter CITES Parties).
88. See text accompanying notes 104-06, 120, 123 for examples of smuggling between
members and nonmembers.
89. Smuggling of gorillas begins in Cameroun, Gabon, Zaire, Equatorial Guinea, and the
Congo Republic, where most gorillas are found.
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Africa which have concentrated pockets of chimpanzee populations. The
eastern region of Africa houses approximately fifty-two percent of all
chimpanzees living on the African continent. In the east, the largest
number of chimpanzees, between 70,000 and 110,000, are estimated to
inhabit an unsurveyed part of northern Zaire.9° Uganda, also in the east,
has between 3000 and 5000 chimpanzees.91 The central region of Africa
contains about forty-three percent of the chimpanzee population.'2 Ga-
bon has between 51,000 and 77,000 chimpanzees; Cameroun contains be-
tween 6000 and 10,000 chimpanzees; the Congo has between 3000 and
5000; and Equatorial Guinea has between 1000 and 2000 chimpanzees. 3
The western region of Africa is home to five percent of the total African
chimpanzees. In the west, Liberia leads in population with 3000 to 4000
chimpanzees. 94 Guinea has between 2000 and 4000 chimpanzees, and Si-
erra Leone has between 1500 and 2500 chimpanzees.95 Of these coun-
tries, only Uganda, Sierra Leone, and Equatorial Guinea are not CITES
members.
However, CITES members often evade the treaty by refusing to en-
act national controls for listed species. Guinea and Zaire, though CITES
members,96 provide no internal protection for wild chimpanzees."7 Libe-
ria and Guinea, both CITES members since 1981, are two of the top
exporters of all wild chimpanzees, despite the fact that under CITES'
Appendix I classification of wild chimpanzees, very few, if any, of these
animals should be traded.9a Guinea is also notorious for being a base for
smuggling chimpanzees into Sierra Leone for reexport overseas." Since
Sierra Leone is not a CITES member, traders may export legally once a
species enters the country.
Of the twenty-one nations inhabited by chimpanzees, six are not
CITES members."co Non-CITES countries trade live animals without
having to account for them to the CITES Secretariat. Not surprisingly,
90. CCCC, ACTION PLAN FOR CHIMPANZEE CONSERVATION IN AFRcA 1-3 (1989)
[hereinafter CCCC, ACTION PLAN]. Northern Zaire has not been thoroughly surveyed, and so
may contain fewer than 20,000 chimpanzees. Id.





96. Guinea has been a CITES member for eight years; Zaire has been a member for thir-
teen years.
97. CCCC, CuRRNT THREAIS, supra note 21, at 1, 17b.
98. See id at 32.
99. See id at 33.
100. See CITES Part'es, supra note 87; CCCC, ACTION PLAN, supra note 90, at 3.
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in these countries much of the chimpanzee population has been depleted.
For example, Sierra Leone and Uganda are not CITES parties.101 In
Sierra Leone, very few chimpanzees remain. Since the 1970s up to 270
chimpanzees have been exported annually from Sierra Leone alone. 0
2
In Uganda, only an estimated three thousand to five thousand chimpan-
zees remain in an area where tens of thousands of chimpanzees once
lived."0 3 The leading importers of primates from these countries are all
CITES members: Canada, France, Japan, the Netherlands, Taiwan, the
United Kingdom, and the United States.104 These countries generally
import chimpanzees for biomedical research, and gorillas for zoos. These
nations are able to import these endangered animals despite CITES be-
cause scientific research and zoological captivity are not regularly consid-
ered commercial uses under CITES. Actually, the CITES provisions
allow these countries to import large numbers of animals with little diffi-
culty, once the animals have been smuggled into a non-CITES country.
There are many other reasons that chimpanzees and gorillas are traded
despite CITES, and this Note will next examine those reasons.
A. Loopholes
CITES has several loopholes which allow violations of the treaty to
occur easily. These violations range from smugglers changing CITES
papers to governments blatantly ignoring CITES instructions. Under-
standing the methods through which CITES is evaded helps to formulate
solutions to the evasions, and eradicate smuggling.
First, the distinction between Appendix I and Appendix II animals
is critical for gorillas and chimpanzees, and opens up possibilities for cap-
tive breeding lies. Because CITES reclassifies trade of gorillas and chim-
panzees bred in captivity as Appendix II transactions, smugglers can
bypass CITES Appendix I restrictions.10 5 Many smugglers claim that an
animal was bred in captivity when in fact the animal has been captured
in the jungle. Such lies rapidly deplete the endangered wild populations.
Frequently a live primate is smuggled into a country, kept for a pe-
riod of time, and then reexported with papers stating that the animal was
bred in captivity. Trader Ingemar Forss described such an occurrence
when he wrote to a comrade, "we now have another zoo in East Europe
where they are willing to keep quarantine and to change the papers later
101. See CITES Parties, supra note 87.
102. CCCC, CURRENT THREATS, supra note 21, at 34.
103. CCCC, AcTMON PLAN, supra note 90, at 3.
104. Pi'mate Trade, supra note 4, at 2.
105. See D. FAVRE, supra note 37, at 186-201.
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on.''°6 Captive breeding claims occur frequently because CITES allows
commercial trade of captive-bred primates, and dealers take advantage of
this permission.
Recently, a "captive-breeding lie" was detected in Poland. The In-
ternational Primate Protection League, an organization dedicated to the
preservation and well-being of primates, discovered what it described as
"the Polish Connection."' 7 Polish zoos were obtaining endangered pri-
mates smuggled in from Africa, Asia, and South America."I These zoos
harbored the animals that had survived the journey, and later reexported
them as captive-bred."°9 CITES provokes this form of evasion by al-
lowing captively bred animals to be classified as Appendix II species.
Another problem with CITES is its amorphous definition of "com-
mercial trade.""'  Because this phrase is extremely vague, the individual
responsible for determining whether an animal is to be used for commer-
cial purposes has a great influence on trade.III For example, it is unclear
under the terms of the treaty whether importing gorillas for zoos consti-
tutes a commercial purpose. Therefore, if a Management Authority of a
country decides that a zoo is not a "commercial" institution, but is run
for scientific value, an animal may be traded to that country. At the
Fifth Conference of the Parties in 1985, CITES members decided that
the term "commercial purposes" "should be defined by the country of
import as broadly as possible so that any transaction which is not wholly
'non-commercial' will be regarded as 'commercial.' "112 However, this
definition still leaves great discretion to the importing official responsible
for ascertaining that the species imported is not used for primarily com-
106. The "Polish Connection," IPPL NEwsLr, Mar. 1989, at 4 [hereinafter The "Polirh
Connection"].
107. Id.
108. See id at 3.
109. See id. Poland became a CITES member in March 1990 and must now account to the
CITES Secretariat for any violations of the treaty. CITES Parties, supra note 87, at 2. Another
example of a captive breeding lie occurred when two gorillas were imported from Spain to
Japan in May 1987 under the guise of being captive bred. Although these gorillas were later
found to be wild caught, the Japanese Management Authority, in replying to the CITES Secre-
tariat, believed the gorillas should be sent to a Japanese zoo for breeding. CITES Doe. 7.20,
supra note 61, Annex 6, at 45. For more details on this incident, see also id. at 11.
110. See D. FAvRs., supra note 37, at 82-86.
111. Favre, Tension Points, supra note 37, at 247, 264-65.
112. CITES Secretariat, Proceedings of the Fifth Meeting of the Conference of the Parties,
Apr. 22-May 3, 1985, CITES Doc. 5.33, at 145 (1985). See also Favre, Tension Points, supra,
note 37, at 247, 264-67, for a more detailed discussion of the 5th Conference proceedings and
the adopted resolution further defining "commercial purposes."
1991]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
mercial purposes.1 13 Since commercial purposes are undefined, the pro-
vision loses much of its strength. Even more leeway is given for trade of
Appendix II species, since they can be traded commercially under Ap-
pendix II quite easily. Thus, the two loopholes of captive breeding and
vaguely defined commercial purposes work together to produce devastat-
ing results. Since there are more opportunities to trade under Appendix
II, population exhaustion occurs more rapidly if an animal is called cap-
tive-bred, is then classified Appendix 11, and can then be traded for a
vaguely defined "commercial purpose."
Furthermore, CITES' language promulgates subjective decision-
making.1 14 CITES allows a country to grant an export permit if the Sci-
entific Authority of that country determines "such export will not be
detrimental to the survival of that species.""' 5 Such a determination is
quite subjective, and subjectivity leaves ample room for corruption to
enter into the decision-making process.11 6 For instance, if precise num-
bers about the population of a species are unavailable to the Scientific
Authority, that individual may be persuaded to guess what he or she
believes is the appropriate figure. The decision to export an African
chimpanzee or gorilla could be colored by monetary promises or political
pressure imposed by the importing country.
B. Noncompliance
Another serious problem with CITES is that it fails to ensure re-
porting on the national level. The Wildlife Trade Monitoring Unit found
that at least forty-five percent of all CITES transactions involving ani-
mals go unreported.' 1 7 Each party to CITES is required to submit com-
plete documentation for all trade of listed flora and fauna.'18 However,
these reports are often not submitted or are submitted incomplete.1 19
Governments, as well as private parties, such as zoos, share respon-
sibility for illegal trade. In 1985 the CITES Secretariat received copies of
113. See CITES, supra note 32, art. III, para. 3(c), 27 U.S.T. at 1094, 993 U.N.T.S. at 246,
for language about satisfaction.
114. David Favre, professor at Detroit College of Law, has advocated this position. Favre,
Tension Points, supra note 37, at 263.
115. CITES, supra note 32, art. III, para. 2(a), art. IV, para. 2(a), 27 U.S.T. at 1093, 1095,
993 U.N.T.S. at 246.
116. Favre, Tension Points, supra note 37, at 263.
117. S. LYSTER, supra note 30, at 269.
118. CITES, supra note 32, art. VIII, paras. 6(b), (7), 27 U.S.T. at 1103, 993 U.N.T.S. at
250, 251.
119. See, eg., CITES Doe. 7.20, supra note 61, at 7 (stating that "Among the obligations
... still not being observed... [is] to make an annual report on the operations of international
trade of listed specimens. .. ").
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export documents supposedly issued from the Lao People's Democratic
Republic government.12 These documents represented animals, includ-
ing primates, as being captive-bred. When the Secretariat inquired, Lao
denied that any captive breeding existed in that country.1 21 Some CITES
member countries also accept reexport certificates that are suspect or in-
complete, supporting the captive breeding scam."2 Thus, careful scru-
tiny of each permit by Management Authorities and customs officials is
imperative to combat such illicit trade.
Parties also circumvent CITES by altering or forging the CITES
permit. For example, a supposed CITES export permit for three gorillas
came from Cameroun, despite gorillas being classified as an Appendix I
species, and thus could not be commercially traded under CITES.'"3
The Cameroun permit bore an official-looking stamp, was signed, and
listed the Taipei Zoo as the recipient. 2 4 As the CITES Secretariat later
observed, the permit and stamp had been removed from another valid
CITES transaction."z Whether the permits were forged or given to a
smuggler by an unauthorized government agent is still unclear.126 Came-
roun, a CITES member, could not trade these gorillas under CITES.12 7
Two of the gorillas died en route.'28
Individuals also alter the CITES certificate's statement of the
animal's origin. Smugglers commonly state on an export permit that an
animal originated from a different country than the one where it was
actually captured. Fortunately, such misrepresentations are readily de-
tectable. In 1988 for example, a chimpanzee was smuggled from Uganda
to Dubai, one of the United Arab Emirates. The paperwork indicated
the animal originated in Zaire, but lacked a Zairean export permit or
Ugandan reexport permit.'2 9 In fact, Zaire prohibits chimpanzee ex-
ports, so Uganda should not have honored an export permit in any
case. 13
0
120. CITES Secretariat, Proceedings of the Sixth Meeting of the Conference of the Parties,
July 12-24, 1987, CITES Doc. 6.19, at F.3 (1987) [hereinafter CITES Doc. 6.19].
121. See id
122. See McFadden, supra note 37, at 316.
123. Update on the Cameroun Gorilla Shipment, supra note 53, at 2.
124. I
125. CITES Doc. 6.19, supra note 120, at A.2.
126. Update on the Cameroun Gorrilla Shipment, supra note 53, at 2.
127. CITES Parties, supra note 87, at 1.
128. Update on the Cameroun Gorilla Shipment, supra note 53, at 2.
129. Gorilla and Chimpanzee Poaching in Uganda, IPPL NEwsL., Mar. 1989, at 1, 4. The
chimpanzee was seized at Entebbe Airport and sent to Entebbe Zoo for care. The 'Polish
Connection," supra note 106, at 17.
130. See The "Polish Connection," supra note 106, at 17.
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Countries also circumvent CITES by granting permits in blatant vi-
olation of the treaty. Governments have allowed trade despite CITES
provisions, and often claim extraordinary circumstances. For example,
twenty chimpanzees were traded from Sierra Leone to Austria in spite of
CITES regulations.'31 Immuno AG Pharmaceutical imported the chim-
panzees for use in biomedical research.'3 2 Prior to the importation, the
Secretariat had specifically advised Austria not to import the animals, as
the trade would violate CITES.133 The Secretariat later concluded that
the export documents did not meet the requirements of articles VI and
X,1 and the importer lacked a Management Authority declaration that
the specimen would not be used primarily for commercial purposes. 135
The Austrian Ministry of Trade ignored the Secretariat, and granted an
exceptional permit for import without following normal CITES
procedures.
1 36
Similarly, in 1987 the United Kingdom, after expressly requesting
the Secretariat's opinion, authorized an import of gorillas from the
Congo after the Secretariat disapproved of the trade. 37 Though the Sec-
retariat deemed the trade detrimental to the survival of the species in the
wild,'38 Great Britain declined a request to reconsider.'39
Finally, governments overlook invalid CITES permits and under-
mine CITES' effectiveness. Political pressure and monetary inducements
spur authorities to be inattentive towards unauthorized or invalid docu-
ments. Despite certain countries' notoriety for issuing inaccurate docu-
ments, some governments nevertheless accept deficient paperwork. The
131. CITES Do. 6.19, supra note 120, at A.1.
132. See id For more information about Immuno AG, see text accompanying notes 141-
49.
133. CITES Doc. 6.19, supra note 120, at A.1.
134. The text of pertinent sections of Articles VI and X is the following: Article VI: "2. An
export permit shall contain the information specified in the model set forth in Appendix IV,
and may only be used for export within a period of six months from the date on which it was
granted. 3. Each permit shall contain the title of the present Convention, the name and any
identifying stamp of the Management Authority granting it and a control number assigned by
the Management Authority. .. ." CITES, supra note 32, art. VI, 27 U.S.T. at 1098-99, 993
U.N.T.S. at 248-49. Article X: "Where export or re-export is to, or import is from, a State not
a party to the present Convention, comparable documentation issucd by the competent author-
ities in that State which substantially conforms with the requirem-.nts of the present Conven-
tion for permits and certificates may be accepted in lieu thereof by any Party." Id art. X, 27
U.S.T. at 1104, 993 U.N.T.S. at 251.
135. CITES Doc. 6.19, supra note 120, at A.I.
136. News & Notes, Chimpanzees Cause Controversy, TRAFFIC (U.S.A.), Feb. 1987, at
25.
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following letter, written in Poland before Poland became a signatory to
CITES, attests to the ease of obtaining a false CITES permit:
Poland is not a CITES member and no import permit is necessary.
Then they (the animals) will be supplied with a CITES export permit
stating that they were bred in Wroclaw Zoo. This is very easy in Po-
land, you could even send a giant panda with such a permit because
nobody in the Ministry cares about that-they are just issuing permits
on request without checking anything.140
Governments should not look away from known forged documents,
but should halt the importer and confiscate the animals.
C. Legal Circumvention of CITES
Many companies try to circumvent the goals of CITES by legally
exploiting the treaty's loopholes. Members of CITES have contracted to
uphold the treaty's goals of preservation, not merely to uphold the
treaty's technical wording. Legal maneuvers to circumvent the treaty's
provisions violate CITES' goals as much as do illegal activities. Both
types of conduct equally threaten the preservation of endangered plants
and animals. The Immuno AG pharmaceutical case dramatizes the
problem of legal circumvention. Immuno AG, an Austrian based phar-
maceutical company, operated a research laboratory in Austria. Once
Austria ratified CITES, Immuno AG planned to move its laboratory fa-
cilities to a non-CITES country. 1 Shirley McGreal, Chairwoman of the
International Primate Protection League, reported a statement made by
the Austrian consul in Sierra Leone that Immuno AG would establish "a
chimpanzee research facility in Sierra Leone... 'to avoid the problems
involved with the importation [to Austria] of live chimpanzees.' "142 By
creating a research facility within a country that is already home to wild
chimpanzees, a company can evade CITES altogether since trade will not
be necessary.
The facility projected using sixty to eighty chimpanzees per year.
Given the number of chimpanzees, McGreal explained that ". . . cheap-
ness of wild-caught chimpanzees appears to be a motivating factor for the
Immuno Company .... 1 , 43 McGreal also commented that [an] Immuno
official... stated that captive breeding of chimpanzees was not an eco-
140. The "Polish Connection," supra note 106, at 1, 7.
141. Immuno AG v. Moor-Jankowski, No. 23545-84, slip. op. at 23 (App. Div. N.Y. Jan.
17, 1989).
142. Id at 4.
143. rd
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nomically viable proposition."'"
Immuno AG filed a libel action in December 1984 against numerous
defendants, including Shirley McGreal and Dr. Jan Moor-Jankowski, for
the publication of an article about Immuno AG in the Journal of Medical
Primatology. 145 In holding that Immuno AG was attempting to circum-
vent CITES,1" The New York appellate court hearing the libel action,
acknowledged that:
[i]t was, after all, true that the strict import and export restrictions
imposed by CITES threatened to cut off Immuno', supply of wild
caught chimpanzees for use in its Austrian laboratories.... [I]t was
fair to conclude that Immuno wished to get around the CITES restric-
tions and was situating the facility in Sierra Leone with that purpose
in mind. 147
The Immuno AG appellate decision recognizes the current legal cir-
cumvention problem. Immuno AG is a private company, and is not it-
self accountable to the CITES Secretariat. However, when Immuno
AG's actions occur within a country that is a party to CITES, that coun-
try is responsible for the imports or exports resulting from Immuno AG's
actions. While a company such as Immuno AG may outwardly present
itself as adhering to the commitment to uphold CITES, it undermines
CITES' purpose. A company's relocation for the purpose of catching
wild endangered animals does not help preserve a species. The company
can escape trade restrictions, and still pay no heed to protectionist policy.
Trapping wild chimpanzees in Africa for research within Africa
does not directly violate the trade prohibitions of CITES. However, it
evades CITES' purpose of saving these animals from extinction just as
pervasively as does outright illegal activity. The consequence, whether
144. Id
145. Moor-Jankowski is professor of medical research at the New York University Medical
School and Director of New York University Medical School's Laboratory for Experimental
Medicine and Surgery in Primates. He is also Director of the World Health Organization
Collaborating Center for Hematology of Primate Animals and is the Editor-in-Chief of the
Journal of Medical Primatology. As Editor, he published in the Journal a letter to the editor by
Shirley McGreal criticizing Immuno AG's proposed plan to build a research facility in Sierra
Leone. Subsequently, Immuno AG ified a libel lawsuit in the United States against numerous
individuals, including McGreal and Moor-Jankowski. Immuno AG's complaint against these
two was eventually dismissed. See id. at 23. Immuno AG has filed over 60 lawsuits (many in
Europe) against people who wrote about or were connected with the publication of writings
about Immuno AG's proposed plans. None have prevailed in court, except for one suit which
was won on a technicality. Telephone Interview with Geza Teleki, Chairman of CCCC (Feb.
13, 1991).
146. Immuno AG v. Moor-Jankowski, slip op. at 27.
147. Id
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trading outside the country's borders occurs or not, is primate popula-
tion depletion; CITES precisely seeks to prevent this result.
Dr. Moor-Jankowski has expressed concern that Immuno AG's pro-
ject conflicted with the WHO's policy regarding the use of endangered
species in biomedical research.'48 Dr. Moor-Jankowski has said that
"Immuno's attempt to circumvent treaty restrictions on trade in endan-
gered species would reflect poorly on others.., engaged in biomedical
research using chimpanzees.... ,
The United States National Institute of Health (NIH) has also ex-
plored the legal circumvention of CITES. James Wyngaarden, the Di-
rector of NIH, confirmed that the government agency is considering
doing AIDS research in Africa and the Soviet Union because U.S. law
bans the importation of chimpanzees. 1'0 Chimpanzees can be experi-
mentally infected with HIV-1 taken from human AIDS patients, and can
thus be used to test the effects of vaccines. 51 However, no chimpanzee
has become very ill from HIV, and so the effects of disease-combatting
drugs cannot be tested. 52 Nevertheless, despite the lack of scientific suc-
cess with the chimpanzee, and despite the harm done to the animal,
Wyngaarden noted that:
NIH scientists want more chimpanzees than are available, but are
thwarted by the U.S. Endangered Species Act and the fourteen-year-
old Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species.... We
clearly don't want to get into an international fracas over seeming to
subvert rules that apply in this country... but.., we're taking a lot of
looks at Africa. 153
Currently in the United States, only those chimpanzees already in
the country, or those being bred in captivity within the country, are le-
gally allowed to be used for research." However, illegal importation
occurs regularly. While the Fish and Wildlife Authority maintains that
no chimpanzees have been imported for biomedical research since 1976,
Dr. Teleki, Chairman of the Committee for the Conservation and Care of
Chimpanzees, has documents from Sierra Leone indicating that 406
chimpanzees were exported in 1975, 1976, and 1978, and were imported
148. IM at 7.
149. Id
150. U.S. Humane Society, HSUS Works to Prevent the Taking of Chimpanzees From the
Wild, HSUS NEws, Fall 1988, at 1 [hereinafter HSUS Works].
151. The Chimp Connection, ANIMAL KiNGDOM, Jan.-Feb. 1989, at 42.
152. Id
153. HSUS Works, supra note 150, at 1.
154. 55 Fed. Reg. 1930 (1990).
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into the United States. The Fish and Wildlife Authority and the Secreta-
riat of CITES have no record of the transactions. 55 -CITES can be, and
is, circumvented by individuals not documenting trade transactions.
D. Reservations
Countries also legally circumvent CITES by making excessive reser-
vations to the treaty. When a country first becomes a CITES member, it
has the option of "reserving out" certain species which it can still trade
with either non-CITES members, or other CITES members with the
same species reservation.' 56 A country can similarly "reserve out" spe-
cies during its membership at specified times. CITES becomes ineffective
if a country makes too many reservations. For example, Japan, one of
the principal importers of primates, has made fourteen reservations in
Appendix I species alone. Moreover, it significantly trades with Mexico,
not a CITES member, and often seems to support trade in contravention
of CITES.157 Evading the spirit of the treaty in this manner is being a
member in name only.
Despite all the aforementioned loopholes and circumvention
problems, there is hope for effective enforcement of CITES. The follow-
ing proposal suggests ways in which the loopholes can be closed, and
circumvention can be halted.
IV. PROPOSAL
Solutions for protecting the wild chimpanzees and gorillas do exist.
Altering CITES itself, changing international attitudes about enforcing
the treaty, and curtailing smuggling will help prevent circumvention.
A. Close Loopholes
First, Article VII, section four of CITES should be repealed; down-
grading animals from Appendix I to Appendix II because they are cap-
tively bred should cease. Species should remain classified as Appendix I
animals even if they are bred in captivity. Animals should be traded
commercially only when their population figures as a whole are sufficient
to reach Appendix II classification. This places the burden on the Scien-
tific Authority, who must be equipped to know the facts and to monitor
populations of species, rather than on an import official who can only
155. On Death Row, DISCOVERY CHANNEL MAG., Oct. 1990, at 37.
156. CITES, supra note 32, art. XVI, 27 U.S.T. at 1113-14, 993 U.N.T.S. at 255-56.
157. McFadden, supra note 37, at 314. See also The CITES Infractions Report, IPPL
NEWSL., Dec. 1989, at 13.
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speculate about captive breeding in any one country. This change will
guarantee that even smugglers' lies about captive breeding will not de-
stroy a species.
As a less drastic measure, if article VII, section four is maintained,
the Management Authority responsible for changing the status of an
animal from Appendix I to Appendix II because of captive breeding
should notify each CITES member of its action immediately. Expedient
worldwide communication of all specific downgradings due to captive
breeding is imperative and feasible. Customs officials in all countries
must know which animals are classified Appendix I, and which animals
are deemed Appendix II. International communication will help elimi-
nate the phenomenon of Appendix I animals passing through customs as
supposed captively bred Appendix II species as a result of an inspector's
lack of knowledge. To further combat captive breeding lies, both the
exporting and the importing countries should be held responsible for en-
suring that Appendix I species are not traded.'58
Second, the parties should provide a more complete definition of
"commercial purposes." This will clearly establish which trades are legal
within the meaning of CITES. Most importantly, the parties should de-
termine that zoos, which are often run for someone's profit, are commer-
cial entities; endangered gorillas thus should not be traded to these
institutions.
Third, CITES should establish an objective numerical standard
which the Scientific and Management Authorities must follow when de-
ciding whether trade will harm a species' chance of survival. This will
eradicate subjective judgments that are perhaps based on motivations
other than protecting the endangered animal, such as monetary reward
158. The Japanese government, when discussing its importation of gorillas from Spain,
claimed that "it is the M.A. of exporting country to judge the specimens as captive.bred and so
that should be the responsibility of exporting country in CITES procedure, if the fact that the
specimens [sic] is not captive-bred, is found afterwards." CITES Doc. 7.20, supra note 61,
Annex 6, at 46. This is precisely not the attitude needed to protect chimpanzees and gorillas.
Rather, both importers and exporters should cooperate in preventing the trade of Appendix I
species. The Secretariat, in his recommendations, made several suggestions which would help
alleviate Appendix I illegal trading:
g) that when the Management Authority is in possession of the necessary infor-
mation it should indicate on any export permit or re-export certificate for live Appen-
dix I specimens bred in captivity:
a) references to the owners of the parents;
b) the identity of the parents (the marking reference where appropriate); and
c) whether a biological 'finger print' test has been carried out.
Id Annex I, at 36. The Secretariat also recommended that "parties... ask for the Secreta-
riat's advice before accepting importation of Appendix I live specimens declared as bred in
captivity. .. " Id at 11. This will help curtail captive breeding lies as well.
1991]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
or political acceptance. This objective standard can be based on numbers
of each remaining species, and trade can be prohibited if the population
numbers descend below appropriate levels.
B. Enforce Compliance
To ensure objective decisions, the Secretariat should require more
diligent national reporting of trade. The Secretariat should also require
each nation to monitor the numbers of Appendix I species both existent
in, and annually traded from the country. As the Secretariat observed,
"the impact of trade on listed species cannot be judged without timely
submission of complete and accurate annual reports." 159 Countries
should incur international penalties for improperly reporting or misrep-
resenting population numbers. Implementing trade sanctions as interna-
tional penalties will always be a delicate political maneuver, especially
since the countries trading animals will most likely be trading commodi-
ties as well. However, the countries involved in CITES must at some
point either express their dedication to the treaty, or acknowledge their
lack of commitment to saving endangered animals from extinction.
There is little room left for political compromise in this area, since the
number of these animals continues to decrease, and these species are still
headed towards total disappearance from this planet. If countries are
serious about saving the endangered species, trade sanctions are an effec-
tive tool for communicating the message that circumvention of CITES
will not be tolerated. The most recent Presentation of Alleged Infrac-
tions from the CITES Secretariat reports that countries still are failing to
meet their obligation to make an annual report on international trade of
listed specimens (Article VIII-7a).1W Both the Secretariat and CITES
members should continue to pressure all countries to adequately fulfill
their reporting commitment.
Moreover, each nation should work towards establishing its own
legislation, or improving their existing legislation and penalty system to
better comply with CITES trade restrictions. The Secretariat stated that
he "considers that most Parties do not have sufficient national legislation
to fully and properly implement the Convention in all aspects."1 61 Also,
the Secretariat observed that states are not taking "the measures neces-
sary for the application of the Convention[,] particularly the legal sanc-
tions (article VIII-l). 1 62 Legislation and penalties are imperative to
159. CITES Doc. 6.19, supra note 120, at H.3.
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ensure that the treaty is enforced in all member nations. Pressure to cre-
ate legislation should be exerted immediately on those member countries
lacking trade regulations or sanctions in effect.
Efforts to reduce trade in endangered species should extend beyond
the scope of CITES. For example, the United States, as a world leader,
should include not only chimpanzees captured in the wild, but also cap-
tive-bred chimpanzees on its endangered species list. The upgrading of
all chimpanzees would be a statement to the world that chimpanzees
need to be protected, it would also reduce international trade since lies
about captive breeding would no longer be effective in the United States.
Many more companies would not legally be able to export from or im-
port into the United States chimpanzees who supposedly had been cap-
tive-bred.
To prevent forgery, the Secretariat should devise a more effective
permit strategy. Each export permit number should match the number
written on the import permit. Alternatively, for Appendix I species, one
designated customs official at the site of export could contact a desig-
nated person at the importing station to verify that codes match. Adding
these intermediary steps should help detect smuggling before the animal
is exported and most likely killed in transport. Also, following CITES
optional suggestions about retaining special ports for imports and exports
would help curtail smuggling. The United States has had success with
this plan,163 and the parties should make this a mandatory provision in
the treaty.
Furthermore, CITES parties must make greater efforts to educate
officials. Customs control workers and Scientific and Management Au-
thorities must be trained to recognize the methods used in the smuggling
of chimpanzees and gorillas. These authorities are the key to realizing
the goals of CITES; they issue the permits, and watch the animals enter
and exit countries. With training, they will be better prepared to recog-
nize forged papers and search for smuggled animals. Management Au-
thorities should know which nations harbor captive breeding, and which
nations may supply suspect permits for specific species. Scientific Au-
thorities must know, perhaps by referring to a current list, the population
number of any species in any country requesting an export or import
permit. Customs officials must understand the techniques used for smug-
gling packages and crates, and must be aware of the suspicious circum-
163. See supra text accompanying note 51.
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stances commonly indicating smuggling. 164 This knowledge and training
can only help prevent violations of the treaty.
Towards this end, CITES should establish continuing education
funds for training both national and international staff. Customs officials
from every CITES nation should undergo an intensive training program
in typical smuggling methods, so they can quickly detect illegal trade.
Also, CITES should fund national programs teaching Scientific Authori-
ties how to monitor population numbers. CITES should further create a
fund solely for the expedient disbursement of infbrmation detailing
smuggling and population figures to every CITES nation, so that the nec-
essary information is always current.
CITES members can also reduce smuggling through economic
means. If the wealthier members are willing either to impose sanctions
upon countries that allow smuggling, or to extend financial incentives to
countries that seek to prevent smuggling, circumvention could be signifi-
cantly reduced. Also, deterrence would be strengthened if member coun-
tries enforced stricter national penalties for discovered illegal or forged
CITES papers. These offenses should be criminalized. Countries often
impose economic sanctions on other countries to discourage various be-
haviors, and this would be one appropriate time for such sanctions.
Finally, CITES should institute activist protection groups in each
nation, similar to Zambia's example. Individuals in the protection
groups can be paid citizens of each country who are familiar with the
terrain of the land and are dedicated to the preservation of endangered
species. These groups can monitor and defend the Appendix I endan-
gered species. Specialized units can be formed to discover smuggled pri-
mates. These activists, coupled with the foregoing external support, can
prevent the endangered species populations from becoming extinct.
V. CONCLUSION
CITES, though somewhat effective, continues to be circumvented in
a variety of ways. Illegal circumvention benefits only the smuggler, and
perhaps the rare recipient of an animal that has survived transport.
Complying with CITES, and restricting trade now, will facilitate trade
for future generations while also ensuring the survival of animal popula-
tions. If rampant smuggling and killing continue, no endangered species
will be left to trade or roam the planet. Awareness is the first step to-
wards an international solution. Understanding how traders circumvent
164. For examples of some forms of smuggling, see text accompanying notes 107-09, 120,
123.
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CITES is crucial, since the continued survival of gorillas and chimpan-
zees depends upon effective enforcement of the treaty. Countries can
more easily take actions designed towards effectuating CITES' intent
when they are conscious of the problems that occur. Though the popula-
tions of gorillas and chimpanzees continue to decline, the strict imple-
mentation of CITES coupled with the halt of smuggling can still save
them from extinction.

